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We propose in this paper a physical-layer security (PLS) scheme for dual-hop cooperative networks in an effort to enhance
the communications secrecy. The underlying model comprises a transmitting node (Alice), a legitimate node (Bob), and an
eavesdropper (Eve). It is assumed that there is no direct link between Alice and Bob, and the communication between them is
done through trusted relays over two phases. In the first phase, precoding-aided spatial modulation (PSM) is employed, owing to
its low interception probability, while simultaneously transmitting a jamming signal from Bob. In the second phase, the selected
relay detects and transmits the intended signal, whereas the remaining relays transmit the jamming signal received from Bob.
We analyze the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of the ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC), the secrecy outage probability
(SOP), and the bit error rate (BER) at Bob and Eve.We obtain closed-form expressions for the ESC and SOP andwe derive very tight
upper-bounds for the BER. We also optimize the performance with respect to the power allocation among the participating relays
in the second phase. We provide examples with numerical and simulation results through which we demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed scheme.
1. Introduction
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless propagation
environment, information transmission security has been
considered as prominent frontier inwireless communications
[1]. In this context, physical-layer security (PLS) has been
introduced in order to ensure confidential communication
by applying communication techniques in the physical layer
by exploiting the spatiotemporal characteristics of wireless
channels [2]. The key idea behind PLS is to exploit different
characteristics of both the main and the eavesdropper’s
channels [3]. The pioneering work on wiretap channel [4]
has shown that perfect secrecy can be achieved if the eaves-
dropper’s channel is a degraded version of the main channel.
Later in [5], it has been shown that perfect secrecy can be
achieved even if the eavesdropper’s channel is on average
better than the main channel, by exploiting the channel
fading.
Due to the importance of physical-layer security, research
work on this topic is gaining more and more interest in
the context of next generation networks. In particular, infor-
mation security is becoming very important in 5G systems
wheremassive user connections and exponentially increasing
wireless services are supported as investigated in [6, 7] and
references therein. In this context, several techniques have
been used in order to safeguard 5G systems. Focusing on
precoding-aided spatial modulation and cooperative jam-
ming, we provide in what follows themotivation behind each
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of these techniques and how it contributes to 5G systems
safeguarding.
In light of the above, a plethora of works has appeared
in the literature, addressing different aspects of physical-layer
security. Based on the concept of spatial modulation (SM)
[8, 9] and owing to its spatial focusing property and its non-
deterministic precoding algorithm, precoding-aided spatial
modulation (PSM) has been presented as a suitable precoding
technique to realize PLS [10–13]. In PSM, two types of modu-
lations, namely, a variation of space shift keying (SSK) [14, 15]
and conventional amplitude-phase modulation (APM), are
jointly used to convey information. Specifically, Pre-SSK is
implemented using the indices of receiver antennas rather
than transmit antennas, with the aid of zero forcing precoding
(ZFP) [16]. In this context, PSM employs two distinctive
advantages: (i) additional information transmission in space
domain and (ii) low-complexity detection [17]. Due to the
several advantages of SM in terms of error performance,
energy efficiency, and complexity (and PSM for all these
advantages with additional security), it becomes a promising
candidate for 5G systems [18, 19]. Therefore, using PSM for
the security of 5G results from the combination of SM with
additional security features.
While PSM has gained attention in the literature as a
solution to enhance the secrecy performance of wiretap
channels, this technique has not been studied in the context of
cooperative communications where the secrecy performance
can be further improved and fit more in 5G systems. Indeed,
relays can be used to enhance the secrecy of the system by
increasing the capacity of the main channel while reducing
the capacity of the eavesdropper channel [20]. In this context,
an appropriate relay selection is used in [21] to enhance
the secrecy performance by taking eavesdroppers’ links into
consideration. In [22], relay selection with destination-based
jamming under a total power constraint is proposed. While
this technique enhances the secrecy performance, it assumes
that Eve has no direct link with Alice and thus puts a
limitation on the location of Eve. Moreover, it requires the
channel state information (CSI) at the relays in order to select
the best relay to the destination.
Considering a dual-hop cooperative scenario, we propose
a PSM-based scheme aimed at enhancing the communication
secrecy between Alice and Bob in the presence of a passive
Eve. Assuming that Alice and Bob can only communicate
through the help of a number of trusted relays, we use
different techniques to enhance the secrecy communication
between these nodes without putting any constraint on the
location of Eve with respect to Alice and Bob. In this context,
using PSM at Alice while simultaneously transmitting a
jamming signal from Bob guarantees the secrecy during the
first phase. In the second phase, the secrecy performance
is enhanced through the use of jamming from multiple
relays. Specifically, the relay selected by PSM detects and
forwards the useful signal while other relays contribute to
the jamming of the eavesdropper. In this paper, we analyze
the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of the
ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) and secrecy outage probability
(SOP) where we obtain closed-form expressions for those
metrics.We also optimize the performancewith respect to the
power allocation among the participating relays in the second
phase. We provide examples with numerical and simulations
results throughwhich we demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed scheme.
In light of the above, the main contributions behind the
work proposed in this paper can be summarized as follows:
(i) Taking advantage of its low probability of intercep-
tion, PSM is extended in this paper to the cooperative
communication scenario where Alice and Bob com-
municate through the help of𝑁𝑅 trusted relays.
(ii) While the secrecy performance for the first phase is
enhanced using PSM, a cooperative jamming from
multiple relays is considered to improve the secrecy
performance during the second phase.
(iii) The ESC and SOP are derived in closed-form expres-
sions and the results are confirmed for accuracy using
Monte-Carlo simulations. Power allocation optimiza-
tion is also given by simulation to further enhance the
secrecy performance of the proposed scheme.
(iv) The ABEP upper-bound expressions at Bob and Eve
are derived and the results are confirmed for accu-
racy using Monte-Carlo simulations. These results
show the advantages of PSM and multirelay jamming
during the first and the second phase, respectively.
Indeed, the proposed techniques enhance the ABEP
performance at Bob while degrading that of Eve.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 defines the system and channel models and the
mode of operation of the proposed PSM-based technique.
Section 3 analyzes the secrecy performance in terms of the
ESC and the OSC. Section 4 confirms this performance via
selected numerical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Notation. In this paper, we use boldface uppercase and
lowercase letters to, respectively, denotematrices and vectors.
The Hermitian transpose, inverse, and trace of a matrix A
are, respectively, represented by A𝐻, A−1, and 𝑡𝑟(A). The 𝑁-
dimensional identity matrix is denoted by I𝑁. The Euclidean
norm, Frobenius norm, absolute value, and real part are,
respectively, represented by ‖ ⋅ ‖, ‖ ⋅ ‖F, | ⋅ |, and R{⋅}. C𝑖×𝑗
stands for a set of complex matrices of 𝑖 × 𝑗 dimensions.
2. System and Channel Models
2.1. System Model. In Figure 1, we consider a secure dual-
hop communication system between Alice and Bob through
the help of 𝑁𝑟 single-antenna trusted relays in the presence
of an eavesdropper, Eve, where Alice has no direct link to
Bob. The number of antennas of Alice, Bob, and Eve are
denoted as𝑁𝑎,𝑁𝑏, and𝑁𝑒, respectively.Thepractical number
of antennas at these nodes depends on the used wireless and
antenna technologies. Indeed, while current LTE devices can
accommodate a maximum of four antennas, future 5G user
equipment will accommodate a larger number of antennas
thanks to the use ofmillimeter-wave andmassiveMIMO[23].
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Figure 1: System model.
Table 1: Precoded SSKmapper rule example for𝑁𝑟 = 4; i.e., 𝑘1 = 2.𝑘1 bits Relay activated e𝑖[0 0] 1 [1 0 0 0]𝑇[0 1] 2 [0 1 0 0]𝑇[1 0] 3 [0 0 1 0]𝑇[1 1] 4 [0 0 0 1]𝑇
In this work, we use a PSM-based relay-selection scheme
in order to take advantage of the low probability of intercep-
tion (LPI) of PSM. Following the principles of PSM [16, 17],
we assume that 𝑁𝑎 > 𝑁𝑟 and that 𝑁𝑟 = 2𝑘1 , where 𝑘1 is a
positive integer to be able to use PSM. Hence, in PSM, relays’
indices can be used by Alice to convey 𝑘1 bits per symbol
information following SSK principles. Therefore, the relay
intended by reception is selected based on the 𝑘1 incoming
bits. In addition to SSK, we assume that Alice also exploits
a conventional𝑀(= 2𝑘2)-ary APM. Thus, each PSM symbol
to be transmitted consists of 𝑘 = 𝑘1 + 𝑘2 bits, which is first
divided into two subsymbols, a 𝑘1-bit SSK symbol and a 𝑘2-
bit APM symbol.The 𝑘1-bit SSK symbol ismapped to a vector
e𝑖, which is the 𝑖th column of an identity matrix I𝑁𝑟 , and the
subscript 𝑖 is determined by the decimal value of the 𝑘1-bit
SSK symbol. The 𝑘2-bit APM symbol is mapped to a unit-
power symbol 𝑏𝑗 chosen from the constellation according
to the decimal value of the 𝑘2-bit APM symbol. Then, the
PSM symbol is formed as s𝑗𝑖 = e𝑖𝑏𝑗. After precoding, this
signal is transmitted via the 𝑁𝑎 transmit antennas of Alice.
An example of relay selected based on the 𝑘1 incoming bits is
given in Table 1.
2.2. Channel Models. In this work, we consider Rayleigh
block fading channels and we denote by ℎ𝑖𝑗 the channel
coefficient between nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗. These coefficients have a
complex Gaussian distribution with zero-mean and variance𝑑−𝛼𝑖𝑗 , i.e., CN(0, 𝑑−𝛼𝑖𝑗 ), where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the distance between
nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗, and 𝛼 is the path-loss exponent of wireless
channels. Let H𝐴𝑅 = [h𝐴𝑅1 , h𝐴𝑅2 , . . . , h𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑟 ]𝑇 be the channel
matrix between Alice and different relays, where h𝐴𝑅𝑖 ∈
C1×𝑁𝑟 is the channel vector between Alice and the 𝑖th relay
having CN(0, 𝑑−𝛼𝐴𝑅𝑖) distributed components, where 𝑑𝐴𝑅𝑖 is
the distance between Alice and the 𝑖th relay.
3. Performance Analysis
3.1. Received Signals. During the first phase, Alice transmits
symbol s𝑗𝑖 via its 𝑁𝑎 antennas. Assuming that the channel
state information to all relays is known to Alice, let P =[p1, p2, . . . , p𝑁𝑟] be a𝑁𝑎 ×𝑁𝑟 precoding matrix used by Alice
in order to send information to one of the relays. Then, the
received signal from Alice at the relays is expressed as
y𝑅 = H𝐴𝑅Ps𝑗𝑖 + 𝜂𝑅, (1)
where 𝜂𝑅 ∈ C𝑁𝑟×1 is the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) experienced by different relays, having com-
plex Gaussian distributions of CN(0, 𝜎2𝑟 ). All channels are
assumed to experience a block Rayleigh fading. While Alice
knows theCSI of Alice-Relays channels, it is unable to acquire
the CSI of Eve because this latter is assumed to be a passive
eavesdropper.
Using the zero forcing precoder, the precoding matrix
used by Alice can be expressed similar to [16] as
P = 𝛽H𝐻𝐴𝑅 (H𝐴𝑅H𝐻𝐴𝑅)−1 , (2)
where
𝛽 = √ ((1 − 𝛿1) 𝑃/2)𝑡𝑟 [(H𝐴𝑅H𝐻𝐴𝑅)−1] (3)
is a power normalization factor to achieve the power con-
straint of 𝑡𝑟(PP𝐻) = (1 − 𝛿1)𝑃/2, 𝑃 denotes the total
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transmitted power during the two phases, and 𝛿1 is a power
allocation factor, 𝛿1 ∈ (0, 1]. In the proposed scheme, the
total power𝑃 is divided equally between the two transmission
phases.Thus,𝑃/2 is used in the first phasewhile being divided
between the useful signal from Alice and the jamming signal
fromBob.This division happens through the use of the power
allocation factor 𝛿1; i.e., (1−𝛿1)𝑃/2 is used byAlice and 𝛿1𝑃/2
is used by Bob.During the second phase, the remaining𝑃/2 is
shared among all relays using the power allocation factor 𝛿2 ∈(0, 1] as follows: (i) 𝑃𝑠 = 𝛿2𝑃/2 is used by the selected relay to
transmit the useful signal and (ii) 𝑃𝐽 = (1 − 𝛿2)𝑃/(2(𝑁𝑟 − 1))
is used by each of the remaining 𝑁𝑟 − 1 relays to send the
jamming signal received from Bob.
Thanks to the use of ZFP, the signal is only received by the𝑖th relay and this can be seen by substituting (2) in (1). Thus,
the received signal from Alice at different relays is given by𝑦𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽𝑏𝑗 + 𝜂𝑅𝑖,𝑦𝑅𝑘 = 𝜂𝑅𝑘, ∀𝑘 ̸= 𝑖. (4)
In this first phase, Bob also cooperates by broadcasting a
jamming signal 𝐽𝐵. Thus, the received signals from Alice and
Bob during this phase at all relays is given by
𝑦𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽𝑏𝑗 + √𝛿1𝑃2 h𝐵𝑅𝑖𝐽𝐵 + 𝜂𝑅𝑖,
𝑦𝑅𝑘 = √𝛿1𝑃2 h𝐵𝑅𝑘𝐽𝐵 + 𝜂𝑅𝑘, ∀𝑘 ̸= 𝑖,
(5)
where h𝐵𝑅𝑘 ∈ C𝑁𝑏×1 is the channel vector between Bob and
the 𝑘th relay 𝑅𝑘. To simplify the detection of Alice’s signal at
the relays, the jamming signal is assumed to have a complex
Gaussian distribution with zero-mean and variance 𝜎2𝐽 ; i.e.,𝐽𝐵 ∼ CN(0, 𝜎2𝐽 ). Thus, the received signal at different relays
can be reformulated as𝑦𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽𝑏𝑗 + ?̃?𝑅𝑖,𝑦𝑅𝑘 = ?̃?𝑅𝑘, ∀𝑘 ̸= 𝑖, (6)
where ?̃?𝑅𝑘 has a complex Gaussian distribution with zero-
mean and variance ?̃?2 = 𝛿1𝑃/2‖h𝐵𝑅𝑘‖2F𝜎2𝐽 + 𝜎𝑟2.
Similar to [24], we assume that the relays communicate
via a backhaul-link (this link can be established through
control channels and does not necessary imply that the used
channels are dedicated). Thus, taking into consideration the
received CSI at the relays from Bob, we can employ the
following centralized low-complexity Maximum Likelihood
(ML) detector:[̂𝑖, ?̂?] = argmin
𝑖,𝑗
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩y𝑅 − 𝛽s𝑗𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩
= argmin
𝑖,𝑗
𝛽 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑏𝑗󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨2 − 2R {𝑦∗𝑅𝑖𝑏𝑗} . (7)
The use of the ML detector in (7) ensures that a single relay
is activated during the second transmission phase. In this
context, the relay intended by the PSM selection is used at the
second phase to transmit the decoded APM signal 𝑏𝑗 using
power 𝑃𝑠 and the remaining 𝑁𝑟 − 1 relays send the perfectly
estimated jamming signal received from Bob during the first
phase each using a power 𝑃𝐽 = (𝑃/2−𝑃𝑠)/(𝑁𝑟 −1). When the
relayed signals are received by Bob, this latter can employ self-
interference subtraction as it knows the jamming signal 𝐽𝐵
and it has received channel estimations with all relays. Thus,
the received signal at Bob is given by
y𝐵 = √𝑃𝑠𝑏𝑗h𝑅𝑖𝐵 + 𝜂𝐵, (8)
where 𝜂𝐵 is the CN(0, 𝜎2𝑏) AWGN at Bob and h𝑅𝑖𝐵 is the
channel coefficient between the 𝑖th relay 𝑅𝑖 and Bob.
During the first phase, the received signal from Alice and
Bob at Eve is expressed as
y𝐸,1 = H𝐴𝐸Ps𝑗𝑖 + √𝛿1𝑃2 H𝐵𝐸𝐽𝐵 + 𝜂𝐸,1, (9)
where 𝜂𝐸,1 ∈ C𝑁𝑒×1 is the AWGN experienced by Eve during
the first phase, having complex Gaussian distribution of
CN(0, 𝜎2𝑒 I𝑁𝑒). H𝐴𝐸 ∈ C𝑁𝑒×𝑁𝑎 is the channel matrix between
Alice and Eve having CN(0, 𝑑−𝛼𝐴𝐸) distributed components.
H𝐵𝐸 ∈ C𝑁𝑒×𝑁𝑏 is the channel matrix between Bob and Eve
havingCN(0, 𝑑−𝛼𝐵𝐸) distributed components.
The received signal at Eve for the second phase is given by
y𝐸,2 = √𝑃𝑠𝑏𝑗h𝑅𝑖𝐸 + √𝑃𝐽∑
𝑘 ̸=𝑖
h𝑅𝑘𝐸𝐽𝐵 + 𝜂𝐸,2, (10)
where 𝜂𝐸,2 ∈ C𝑁𝑒×1 is the CN(0, 𝜎2𝑒 ) AWGN experienced by
Eve during the second phase.
3.2. Ergodic Secrecy Capacity. Using the received signal
expression in (8), the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Bob can
be expressed as
Γ𝐵 = 𝑃𝑠𝜎2
𝑏
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩h𝑅𝑖𝐵󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2F . (11)
The SNRs at Eve for both the first and second phases are
derived using (9) and (10), respectively, as follows:
𝛾𝐸,1 = 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩H𝐴𝐸P󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2F𝛿1 (𝑃/2) 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩H𝐵𝐸󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2F 𝜎2𝑔 + 𝜎2𝑒 (12)
and
𝛾𝐸,2 = 𝑃𝑠 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩h𝑅𝑖𝐸󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2F𝑃𝐽∑𝑘 ̸=𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩h𝑅𝑘𝐸󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2F 𝜎2𝑔 + 𝜎2𝑒 . (13)
Similar to [22], the ergodic secrecy capacity for the consid-
ered dual-hop scheme can be given as
𝐶𝑠 = E{[12 log2 (1 + Γ𝐵1 + Γ𝐸)]+} , (14)
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where Γ𝐸 = max(𝛾𝐸,1, 𝛾𝐸,2) in order to account for the worst-
case scenario.
In this paper, we take advantage of the low probability
of interception of PSM to guarantee the secrecy of the
transmission during the first phase and thus assume that Γ𝐸 =𝛾𝐸,2. Indeed, as discussed in [11], if the Alice-Relays channels
vary fast enough, the transmission from Alice to each relay is
more or less a “one-time pad” cryptographic scheme, which is
rendered absolutely secure. In this scenario, Eve cannot detect
any information sent from Alice to Bob due to the one-time
pad effect. When the Alice-Bob channels vary sufficiently
slow, Eve is still incapable of detecting the SSK symbol 𝑖, as
Eve is unable to estimate the precoding matrix P separately.
Consequently, Eve needs to have both its CSI of H𝐴,𝐸 and
the perfect knowledge of P to successfully eavesdrop s𝑗𝑖 .Thus,
we assume that Eve is not able to get any useful information
during the first phase. In order to confirm this assumption,
we show in Figure 2 that 𝛾𝐸,2 exceeds 𝛾𝐸,1 almost surely for
different simulation scenarios and parameters.
Due to intractability of (14), we can derive a lower bound
on the ESC as follows:
𝐶𝑠 ≥ 𝐶𝑠𝑙𝑏 = [E{12 log2 (1 + Γ𝐵1 + Γ𝐸)}]+= 12 ln 2 [E {ln (1 + Γ𝐵)} − E {ln (1 + Γ𝐸)}]+ .
(15)
Assuming that all noise variances are equal to 𝜎2, we define
the average SNRs 𝜌 = 𝑃/(2𝜎2) and 𝜌𝑠 = 𝑃𝑠/𝜎2. Thus, the
received SNR at Bob can be written as
Γ𝐵 = 𝜌𝑠 𝑁𝑏∑
𝑘=1
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨ℎ𝑅𝑖𝐵𝑘 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨2 , (16)
and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Γ𝐵 is given
by
𝐹Γ𝐵 (𝛾𝑏) = 1 − 𝑁𝑏−1∑
𝑘=0
1𝑘! ( 𝛾𝑏𝛾𝑏𝜌𝑠)
𝑘 𝑒−𝛾𝑏/𝜌𝑠𝛾𝑏 , (17)
where 𝛾𝑏 = 𝑑−𝛼𝑅,𝐵.
Using the CDF approach, the first part of the ergodic
secrecy capacity lower bound is given in closed-form by
E {ln (1 + Γ𝐵)} = ∫∞
0
1 − 𝐹Γ𝐵 (𝛾𝑏)1 + 𝛾𝑏 𝑑𝛾𝑏
= 𝑁𝑏−1∑
𝑘=0
1𝑘!𝛾𝑏𝑘𝜌𝑠𝑘 ∫∞0 𝛾
𝑘
𝑏1 + 𝛾𝑏 𝑒−𝛾𝑏/𝜌𝑠𝛾𝑏𝑑𝛾𝑏
= 𝑁𝑏−1∑
𝑘=0
1𝛾𝑏𝑘𝜌𝑠𝑘Ψ(𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 + 1; 1𝜌𝑠𝛾𝑏) ,
(18)
where Ψ(⋅, ⋅; ⋅) is the Confluent Hypergeometric function of
the second kind [25, equation (9.211.4)]. Similarly, using (13),
the CDF of Eve’s SNR is given by
𝐹𝛾𝐸,2 (𝛾𝑒) = ∫∞
0
𝐹𝑋 ( 1𝜌𝑠 (𝑃𝐽𝑦 + 1) 𝛾𝑒)𝑓𝑌 (𝑦) 𝑑𝑦, (19)
where 𝐹𝑋(⋅) is the CDF of the random variable 𝑋 = ‖h𝑅𝑖𝐸‖2F
and 𝑓𝑌(⋅) is the probability density function (PDF) of the RV𝑌 = ∑𝑘 ̸=𝑖 ‖h𝑅𝑘𝐸‖2F representing in this case the summation of𝑁 = 𝑁𝑒(𝑁𝑟 − 1) exponential random variables.
Using the CDF approach, similar to (18), the second part
of the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound can be obtained:
E {ln (1 + Γ𝐸)} = ∫∞
0
1 − 𝐹Γ𝐸 (𝛾𝑒)1 + 𝛾𝑒 𝑑𝛾𝑒
= 𝑁𝑒−1∑
𝑘=0
𝑘∑
𝑗=0
(𝑁 + 𝑗 − 1)!𝑃𝑗𝐽𝜌𝑠𝑁+𝑗−𝑘𝑗! (𝑘 − 𝑗)! (𝑁 − 1)!𝛾𝑘−𝑗𝑒
× ∫∞
0
𝛾𝑘𝑒(𝛾𝑒 + 1) (𝑃𝐽𝛾𝑒 + 𝜌𝑠)𝑁+𝑗 𝑒−𝛾𝑒/𝛾𝑒𝜌𝑠𝑑𝛾𝑒,
(20)
where 𝛾𝑒 = 𝑑−𝛼𝑅𝑖 ,𝐸.
3.3. Secrecy Outage Probability. The secrecy outage probabil-
ity is defined as the probability of the secrecy capacity 𝐶𝑠
being less than a predetermined secrecy rateR𝑠 [5] and it is
given by
𝑃out (R𝑠) = Pr [𝐶𝑠 ≤R𝑠]= Pr [Γ𝐵 ≤ 2R𝑠 (1 + Γ𝐸) − 1]
= ∫∞
0
𝐹Γ𝐵 (2R𝑠 (1 + 𝛾𝑒) − 1) 𝑓Γ𝐸 (𝛾𝑒) 𝑑𝛾𝑒
= 1 − 𝑁𝑏−1∑
𝑙=0
𝑃𝑁𝐽𝑙!𝛾𝑏𝑙𝜌𝑠𝑙
𝑁𝑒−1∑
𝑘=0
𝑘∑
𝑗=0
(𝑁 + 𝑗 − 1)!𝜌𝑠𝑁+𝑗−𝑘𝑗! (𝑘 − 𝑗)! (𝑁 − 1)!𝛾𝑘−𝑗𝑒
× 𝑙∑
𝑚=0
𝑚∑
𝑛=0
( 𝑙𝑚)(𝑚𝑛) (−1)𝑙−𝑚 2𝑚R𝑠𝑒−2R𝑠−1/𝜌𝑠𝛾𝑒
× ∫∞
0
( 1𝜌𝑠𝛾𝑒 𝛾2𝑒 + (𝑁 + 𝑗 − 𝑘 + 1𝑃𝐽𝛾𝑒)𝛾𝑒 − 𝑘 𝜌𝑠𝑃𝐽)
× 𝛾𝑛+𝑘−1𝑒(𝛾𝑒 + 𝜌𝑠/𝑃𝐽)𝑁+𝑗+1 𝑒−(2R𝑠+1)𝛾𝑒/𝜌𝑠𝛾𝑒𝑑𝛾𝑒.
(21)
Using change of variables and Binomial expansion, the
outage probability can be obtained in closed-form in (22)
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where 𝑎 = (2R𝑠 + 1)/𝑃𝐽𝛾𝑒, 𝑏 = 𝜌𝑠/𝑃𝐽, and Γ(⋅, ⋅) is the upper
incomplete Gamma function:
𝑃out (R𝑠) = 1 − 𝑁𝑏−1∑
𝑙=0
𝑃𝑁𝐽𝑙!𝛾𝑏𝑙𝜌𝑠𝑙
⋅ 𝑁𝑒−1∑
𝑘=0
𝑘∑
𝑗=0
(𝑁 + 𝑗 − 1)!𝜌𝑠𝑁+𝑗−𝑘𝑗! (𝑘 − 𝑗)! (𝑁 − 1)!𝛾𝑘−𝑗𝑒
⋅ 𝑙∑
𝑚=0
𝑚∑
𝑛=0
( 𝑙𝑚)(𝑚𝑛) (−1)𝑙−𝑚 2𝑚R𝑠𝑒−2R𝑠−1/𝜌𝑠𝛾𝑒
× { 1𝜌𝑠𝛾𝑒 𝑛+𝑘+1∑𝑝=0 (𝑛 + 𝑘 + 1𝑝 ) (−𝑏)𝑛+𝑘+1−𝑝 (𝑏𝑎)𝑝+1
⋅ Γ (𝑝 − 𝑁 − 𝑗, 𝑎) + (𝑁 + 𝑗 − 𝑘 + 1𝑃𝐽𝛾𝑒)
⋅ 𝑛+𝑘∑
𝑞=0
(𝑛 + 𝑘𝑞 ) × (−𝑏)𝑛+𝑘−𝑞 (𝑏𝑎)𝑞+1 Γ (𝑞 − 𝑁 − 𝑗, 𝑎)
− 𝑘𝑏𝑛+𝑘−1∑
𝑟=0
(𝑛 + 𝑘 − 1𝑟 ) (−𝑏)𝑛+𝑘−1−𝑟 Γ (𝑟 − 𝑁 − 𝑗, 𝑎)
⋅ (𝑏𝑎)𝑟+1}𝑒−𝑎/𝑏.
(22)
3.4. Average Bit Error Probability
3.4.1. ABEP of Bob. In this part, the theoretical ABEP of Bob
is derived. Based on the analysis of [26, 27], the end-to-end
ABEP is expressed as𝑃Bob (𝛾1, 𝛾2) = 𝑃1 (𝛾1) + 𝑃2 (𝛾2) − 𝑃1 (𝛾1) 𝑃2 (𝛾2) . (23)
Here, 𝑃1(𝛾1) is the ABEP between Alice and the RN, during
the first time slot, for a given transmit SJNR 𝛾1 and 𝑃2(𝛾2)
is the ABEP between the RN and Bob, during the second
slot, for a given transmit SNR 𝛾2. Hence the evaluation of the
ABEP of Bob requires the evaluation of 𝑃1(𝛾1) and 𝑃2(𝛾2).
During the first slot, assuming ZF precoding at Alice with
P = H𝐻AR (HARH𝐻AR)−1 , (24)
the received signal at the RN is given as
yR = √𝑃𝐴𝑑−𝛼ARDx + w̃. (25)
Here, it holds that HAR = √𝑑−𝛼ARH̃AR, with H̃AR ∼ CN(0, I).
In (25), 𝑃𝐴 denotes Alice’s transmit power and w̃ is a vector
denoting the composite effect of noise plus jamming from
Bob. Also, D is the 𝑁𝑟 × 𝑁𝑟 diagonal normalization matrix
defined as D = √𝑑−𝑎ARdiag(𝑑1, . . . , 𝑑𝑁𝑟), where
𝑑𝑖 = √ 1[(H̃ARH̃𝐻AR)−1]
𝑖,𝑖
. (26)
Here, we note that the ZF precoder defined in (24)
is equivalent to the one defined in (2). We use the new
definition only for analytical tractability and for the sake of
the simplicity of the derived ABEP results. This also enriches
the paper by giving two different ways of defining the ZF
precoder used at Alice under the same assumptions.
Since jamming is treated as noise at the RN, the detector
at the RN is given as
(x) = argminx 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩yR −Dx󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩22 . (27)
In particular, (27) is the ML detector of PSM. Therefore,𝑃1(𝛾1) is the ABEP of PSM with the jamming effect. Hence,
the ABEP during the first hop at the RN is given as
𝑃1 (𝛾1) ≤ 1𝑀𝑘𝑡∑x ∑x ̸=x̂𝑑 (x 󳨀→ x̂) 𝑃R−SM (x 󳨀→ x̂) , (28)
where 𝑑(x 󳨀→ x̂) is the Hamming distance between the bit
sequences represented by x and x̂. 𝑘𝑡 = (𝑘1 + 𝑘2)/2 is equal to
the total number of bits transmitted per symbol period. We
note that 𝑘1 + 𝑘2 is divided by two because the transmitted
bitstream requires two symbol periods to reach Bob. Also,𝑃R−SM(x 󳨀→ x̂) is the PEP of transmitting x at Alice and
erroneously detecting x̂ at the relay nodes.
Based on the analysis presented in [28, Section IV], the
instantaneous PEP is given as
𝑃R−SM (x 󳨀→ x̂, 𝛾1 | D2) = 𝑄(√ c𝐻D2c2 𝑃𝐴𝑑−𝑎AR𝛾1) , (29)
where c = x − x̂. Considering the following upper bound of
the 𝑄-function [29]:
𝑄 (𝑥) ≤ 3∑
𝑖=1
𝛽𝑖𝑒−𝜇𝑖𝑥2 , (30)
in (29) and averaging over all possible realizations of the
Alice-RN channel, the average PEP of PSM is expressed as
[28, Section IV]
𝑃R−SM (x 󳨀→ x̂) ≤ 3∑
𝑖=1
𝛽𝑖 [∏𝑁𝑙=1 (𝛼1/𝛼𝑙)𝐿]2 (𝜇𝑖𝛼1𝑃𝐴𝑑−𝑎AR𝛾 + 1)𝐿
× +∞∑
𝑘=0
𝛿𝑘 (𝜇𝑖𝛼1𝑃𝐴𝑑−𝑎AR𝛾 + 1)−𝑘 . (31)
Here, it holds that 𝛽1 = 1/2, 𝛽2 = 1/12, 𝛽3 = 1/4,𝜇1 = 2, 𝜇2 = 1, and 𝜇3 = 1/2. Furthermore, for a given
pair of x𝑖 and x̂𝑖, 𝑁 is the number of nonzero elements of c.
Also, 𝛼𝑙, 𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑁, stand for the eigenvalues of A = BR
in ascending order. Here, B is a diagonal matrix, defined as
B = diag(𝑏1, . . . , 𝑏𝑁), where 𝑏𝑙, 𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑁, is the absolute
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value of the 𝑙th nonzero element of c𝑖. In addition,R is a𝑁×𝑁
matrix given as shown in (33).𝛿𝑘+1
= {{{{{{{{{{{{{
1, 𝑘 = −1,𝑘𝑘 + 1 𝑘+1∑
𝑖=1
[[
𝑁∑
𝑗=1
(1 − 𝛼1𝛼𝑗)𝑖]]𝛿𝑘+1−𝑖, 𝑘 = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
(32)
R = [[[[[[[[[
1 √𝜌𝑐 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ √𝜌𝑐√𝜌𝑐 d d ...... d d √𝜌𝑐√𝜌𝑐 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ √𝜌𝑐 1
]]]]]]]]]
. (33)
In (33), 𝜌𝑐 denotes the Pearson product-moment corre-
lation coefficient between any pair of two different random
variables (RVs) 𝑑21, . . . , 𝑑2𝑅. Moreover, 𝛿𝑘, 𝑘 = 0, 1, 2, . . ., are
given in (32). Finally, it holds that 𝐿 = 𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝑟 + 1.
During the second hop, the received signal at Bob is
expressed as
yB = √𝑃𝑅HRBx + wB, (34)
after the ideal removal of the jamming signal. In (34), it holds
that HRB = √𝑑−𝑎RBH̃RB, with H̃RB ∼ CN(0, I). Also, 𝑃𝑅 is
the transmission power at the RN. Note that the value of𝑃𝑅 is selected such that the transmitted signal at the RN is
normalized. As the RN retransmits binary information by
using SM, Bob can deploy the following ML detector [8]:
(x̆) = argminx 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩yB − √𝑃𝐵𝑑−𝑎RBH̃RBx󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩22 . (35)
Therefore, the ABEP of the second hop is given as
𝑃2 (𝛾2) ≤ 1𝑀𝑘𝑡∑x ∑x ̸=x̂𝑑 (x 󳨀→ x̂) ,𝑃SM (x 󳨀→ x̂) , (36)
where 𝑃SM(x 󳨀→ x̂) is the average PEP of transmitting x
at the RN, while the detector of Bob decides in favor of x̂.
Considering the statistical characteristics of the noise at Bob,
it can be shown that the instantaneous PEP is given as𝑃SM (x 󳨀→ x̂, 𝛾2 | H̃RB)
= 𝑄(√ 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩H̃RBc󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩222 𝑃𝑅𝑑−𝑎RB𝛾2). (37)
In (37), it is shown that the RV𝑋 = ‖H̃RBc‖22 follows an Erlang
distribution with the following PDF [30]:
𝑓𝑋 (𝑥) = 1‖c‖2𝑁𝑟2 Γ (𝑁𝑟)𝑥𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑥/‖c‖22𝐻0 (𝑥) , (38)
where 𝐻0(𝑥) is the Heaviside step function defined as𝐻0(𝑥) = 0 for 𝑥 < 0 and 𝐻0(𝑥) = 1 for 𝑥 ≥ 0. Considering
(30) and (38) in (37), the average PEP of the second hop is
given as
𝑃SM (x 󳨀→ x̂) ≤ 3∑
𝑖=1
𝛽𝑖‖c‖2𝑁𝑟2 Γ (N𝑟)
× ∫+∞
0
𝑥𝑁𝑟−1𝑒−(𝑃𝑅𝑑−𝑎RB𝜇𝑖𝛾2+1/‖c‖22)𝑥d𝑥, (39)
by averaging over possible realizations of the RV𝑋. From [25,
p.346, 3.381, 4], it holds that
∫+∞
0
𝑥]−1𝑒−𝜇𝑥𝑑𝑥 = 𝜇−]Γ (]) . (40)
The use of (30) and (40) into (39), after a straightforward
elaboration, results in
𝑃SM (x 󳨀→ x̂) ≤ 3∑
𝑖=1
𝛽𝑖 (‖c‖22 𝜇𝑖𝑃𝑅𝑑−𝑎RB𝛾2 + 1)−𝑁𝑟 . (41)
In this way, the ABEP of Bob is computed via (23) by using
(28), (31), (36), and (41).
3.4.2. ABEP of Eve. In this part, the theoretical ABEP of Eve
is derived. As previously shown in Figure 2, the Signal-to-
Jamming-Plus-Noise Ratio at Eve during the second phase is
much higher than the SJNRduring the first phase for different
simulation scenarios and parameters. Thus, the ABEP of Eve
during the first phase is much worse than the ABEP during
the second phase. Accounting for the worst-case scenario
(i.e., taking the highest SNR at Eve and assuming perfect
detection at the relays during the first phase), the SJNR at Eve
when the 𝑖th relay is used during the second phase is given by
𝛾𝐸 = 𝑃𝑠 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩h𝑅𝑖𝐸󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2F𝑃𝐽∑𝑘 ̸=𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩h𝑅𝑘𝐸󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2F 𝜎2𝑔 + 𝜎2𝑒 . (42)
In light of the above, the asymptotic performance bound of
the ABEP at Eve with optimal detection is derived using the
union bound as
𝑃𝐸 ≤ 𝑀∑
𝑞=1
𝑀∑̂
𝑞=1
𝑁𝑟𝑁(𝑞, ?̂?)𝑀 𝑃(𝑥𝑗𝑞 󳨀→ 𝑥̂𝑗𝑞) , (43)
where 𝑁(𝑞, ?̂?) is the number of bits in error between the
symbol 𝑥𝑞 and 𝑥𝑞, and 𝑃(𝑥𝑗𝑞 󳨀→ 𝑥̂𝑗𝑞) denotes the PEP
of deciding on the constellation vector 𝑥̂
𝑗𝑞
given that 𝑥𝑗𝑞 is
transmitted and can be formulated as𝑃(𝑥𝑗𝑞 󳨀→ 𝑥̂𝑗𝑞) = ∫∞V=0 𝑄 (√V) 𝑓𝜅 (V) 𝑑V, (44)
where 𝑓𝜅(⋅) is the PDF and is a chi-squared random variable
with 2𝑁𝑒 degrees of freedom given by [31, p. 41] as
𝑓𝜅 (V) = V𝑁𝑒−1exp (−V/ (2𝛼2))(2𝛼2)𝑁𝑒 (𝑁𝑒 − 1)! , (45)
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where
𝛼2 = 𝛿2𝜌(1 − 𝛿2) 𝜌 + 1 (
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑥𝑞󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨2 + 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑥𝑞󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨24 ) . (46)
Thus, the PEP in (44) is obtained in closed-form as
𝑃(𝑥𝑗𝑞 󳨀→ 𝑥̂𝑗𝑞) = 𝛾𝑁𝑒𝑁𝑒−1∑
𝑤=0
(𝑁𝑒 + 𝑤 − 1𝑤 ) (1 − 𝛾)𝑤 , (47)
where
𝛾 = 12 (1 − √ 𝛼21 + 𝛼2) . (48)
Finally, plugging in (47) in (43), the ABEP at Eve is obtained
as
𝑃𝐸 ≤ 𝑀∑
𝑞=1
𝑀∑̂
𝑞=1
𝑁𝑟𝑁(𝑞, ?̂?) 𝛾𝑁𝑒 ∑𝑁𝑒−1𝑤=0 (𝑁𝑒+𝑤−1𝑤 ) (1 − 𝛾)𝑤𝑀 . (49)
4. Numerical Results
In this section, we present selected numerical examples to
confirm the ergodic secrecy capacity and the secrecy outage
probability results derived in the previous section. We also
present the bit error rate (BER) comparison for Bob and Eve
by simulations. In these results, we assume that the secrecy
during the first phase is guaranteed thanks to the use of PSM
[10]. Indeed, the received SNR at Eve during the second phase
exceeds that of the first phase with very high probability as
discussed in Section 3.2 and shown in Figure 2.
As discussed earlier, the total power is allocated during
the first and second phases using the power allocation factors𝛿1 and 𝛿2, respectively. While both power allocation factors
have effect on the performance of the proposed scheme,𝛿2 has more weight and affects the BER performance more
than 𝛿1. Indeed, the beamforming used at Alice during the
first phase maximizes the received SNR at the intended relay
which reduces the effect of the power allocation factor 𝛿1. In
what follows, we study the effect of 𝛿2 and show that it has
moreweight and affects the performancemore than𝛿1. In this
context, Figure 3 presents the effect of the power allocation
coefficient 𝛿2 during the second phase on the secrecy outage
probability. We can see from this figure that the value of the
optimal power allocation coefficient 𝛿∗2 depends on different
parameters including the number of antennas at different
nodes. For instance, while 𝛿∗2 is equal to 0.3 for 𝑁𝑏 = 4 and𝑁𝑒 = 2, it is equal to 0.45 for 𝑁𝑏 = 4 and 𝑁𝑒 = 16. The
exact values for the optimal power allocation coefficient can
be mathematically derived by optimizing the SOP expression
in (22). It can also be obtained through the asymptotic outage
secrecy performance and we look at addressing this as a
future extension to this work in order to further enhance
the performance of the proposed scheme. In the following
results, we use the optimal power allocation coefficient values
obtained by simulations when generating the SOP curves.
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Figure 2: Probability that 𝛾𝐸,2 exceeds 𝛾𝐸,1 as a function of the
average SNR with different 𝑁𝑎 and 𝑁𝑏 for 𝑁𝑟 = 𝑁𝑒 = 4 and𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 0.5.
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Figure 3: Effect of the power allocation at the second phase on the
SOP with different 𝑁𝑏 and 𝑁𝑟, for N𝑒 = 4, 𝜌 = 20 dB,R𝑠 = 1, and𝛿1 = 0.5.
In Figure 4, we present the secrecy outage probability as
a function of the average received SNR with both simulation
and analysis. This figure is given for a secrecy rate threshold
R𝑠 = 1 bits/s/Hz, 𝑁𝑟 = 4, 𝑁𝑒 = 4, and for different number
of antennas at Bob. The power allocation coefficient 𝛿2 is
selected as discussed above and is equal to 𝛿∗2 corresponding
to each number of antennas at Bob. Figure 4 also compares
the performance of the proposed scheme to the case where a
single relay participates in transmitting the jamming signal at
the second phase. We can clearly see the advantage of using
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Figure 4: SOP comparison with the case where a single relay is used
for jamming, for R𝑠 = 1 bits/s/Hz, 𝑁𝑎 = 4, 𝑁𝑟 = 4, 𝑁𝑒 = 4, and𝛿1 = 0.5.
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Figure 5: ESC with different number of antennas at Bob and Eve,
for𝑁𝑎 = 4,𝑁𝑟 = 4, 𝛿1 = 0.5, and 𝛿2 = 0.75.
multiple relays for jamming as it enhances the secrecy outage
probability by further degrading the received SNR at Eve.
Figure 5 presents the ESC in bits/s/Hz as a function of the
average SNR 𝜌 = 𝑃/(2𝜎2) with different number of antennas
at Bob and Eve, for𝑁𝑎 = 4,𝑁𝑟 = 4, 𝛿1 = 0.5, and 𝛿2 = 0.75.
These results show the accuracy of the analytical derivations
presented in the previous section. We can also see from this
figure the effect of different parameters on the ESC. In this
context, we can confirm the improvement of the secrecy rate
through increasing the number of antennas at Bob and its
degradation by increasing the number of antennas at Eve.
We can also see that, for high average SNRs, the number of
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Figure 6: BER comparison at Bob and Eve for different power
allocations during the second phase, for 𝑁𝑎 = 4, 𝑁𝑟 = 4, 𝑁𝑏 = 4,𝑁𝑒 = 4, and 𝛿1 = 0.5.
antennas at Eve has less effect of the ESC performance and
the curves for𝑁𝑒 = 1 and𝑁𝑒 = 4 converge.
Figure 6 depicts the BER at Bob and Eve as a function of 𝜌
for different power allocation coefficients 𝛿2. This figure con-
firms the tightness of the ABEP bounds derived in the previ-
ous section.Themain goal of the proposed scheme is tomake
sure that Eve is not able to detect the information exchanged
between Alice and Bob. To this end, we use precoding-aided
spatialmodulation and cooperative jamming.Thanks to these
techniques, the SNR at Eve becomes very low and, thus, the
error performance degrades. The simulation results shown
in Figure 6 confirm the improvement of the BER at Bob
compared to the BER at Eve thanks to the use of themultirelay
jamming. From this figure, we can also see that the BER at
both Bob and Eve improves when more power is allocated
for the relay selected by PSM (i.e., the relay transmitting
the message). On the other hand, the BER at both receivers
degrades when more power is allocated to the jamming
relays.
In Figure 7, we study the effect of the number of receive
antennas on the BER at Bob and Eve as a function of 𝜌
for 𝑁𝑎 = 4, 𝑁𝑟 = 4, 𝛿1 = 0.5, and 𝛿2 = 0.7. These
simulation results show the improvement of the BER at Bob
and Eve for higher number of receive antennas at each of
these nodes. From this figure, we can also confirm that the
use of multirelay jamming comes with improved BER at Bob
compared to the BER at Eve. Indeed, Eve experiences much
worse detection performance thanks to the use of PSM and
jamming from Bob in the first phase and the use of jamming
from𝑁𝑟 − 1 relays in the second phase.
In the above results, we note that we used a fixed number
of relays, equal to four, only to simplify the simulations.
However, we need to highlight that the performance of the
proposed scheme depends on the number of available relays.
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Figure 7: BER comparison at Bob and Eve for different number of
receive antennas, for𝑁𝑎 = 4,𝑁𝑟 = 4, 𝛿1 = 0.5, and 𝛿2 = 0.7.
Indeed, in the proposed work, while increasing the number
of relays enhances the spectral efficiency as a property of
precoding-aided spatial modulation, it causes a degradation
in the BER performance [32]. Indeed, the increase in 𝑁𝑟 is
equivalent to increasing the constellation size of the index
modulation used during the second phase while keeping
the same transmit power. This case will generate more
errors at the ML detector as the distance between different
constellation points shrinks with a higher𝑁𝑟 and a constant
transmit power, divided between all relays using the power
allocation factor 𝛿2.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the physical-layer security
of a wiretap channel using a PSM-based relay-selection
scheme with multiple relays’ jamming. The performance of
the proposed system is evaluated in terms of the ergodic
secrecy capacity, secrecy outage probability, and bit error
rate performances. Numerical results, confirmed by analysis,
show an enhanced secrecy performance when compared to
selected schemes. Using simulations, we use power allocation
optimization in order to divide the power between the relay
transmitting the useful information and the jamming relays,
and thus we further improve the secrecy performance of
the proposed scheme. In this paper, we have also provided
closed-form expressions for the ESC and SOP and we derive
very tight upper-bounds for the BER. These results confirm
the ESC, SOP, and BER performance improvements at Bob
and its degradation at Eve, which confirms the high secrecy
performance of the proposed scheme.
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